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Abstract
A central question in game theory and artiﬁcial intelligence is how a rational agent
should behave in a complex environment, given that it cannot perform unbounded
computations. We study strategic aspects of this question by formulating a sim-
ple model of a game with additional costs (computational or otherwise) for each
strategy. First we connect this to zero-sum games, proving a counter-intuitive gen-
eralization of the classic min-max theorem to zero-sum games with the addition
of strategy costs. We then show that potential games with strategy costs remain
potential games. Both zero-sum and potential games with strategy costs maintain
a very appealing property: simple learning dynamics converge to equilibrium.
1 The Approach and Basic Model
How should an intelligent agent play a complicated game like chess, given that it does not have
unlimited time to think? This question reﬂects one fundamental aspect of “bounded rationality,” a
term coined by Herbert Simon [1]. However, bounded rationality has proven to be a slippery concept
to formalize (prior work has focused largely on ﬁnite automata playing simple repeated games such
as prisoner’s dilemma, e.g. [2, 3, 4, 5]). This paper focuses on the strategic aspects of decision-
making in complex multi-agent environments, i.e., on how a player should choose among strategies
of varying complexity, given that its opponents are making similar decisions. Our model applies to
general strategic games and allows for a variety of complexities that arise in real-world applications.
For this reason, it is applicable to one-shot games, to extensive games, and to repeated games, and
it generalizes existing models such as repeated games played by ﬁnite automata.
To easily see that bounded rationality can drastically affect the outcome of a game, consider the
following factoring game. Player 1 chooses an n-bit number and sends it to Player 2, who attempts
to ﬁnd its prime factorization. If Player 2 is correct, he is paid 1 by Player 1, otherwise he pays 1
to Player 1. Ignoring complexity costs, the game is a trivial win for Player 2. However, for large n,
the game should is essentially a win for Player 1, who can easily output a large random number that
Player 2 cannot factor (under appropriate complexity assumptions).
In general, the outcome of a game (even a zero-sum game like chess) with bounded rationality is
not so clear. To concretely model such games, we consider a set of available strategies along with
strategy costs. Consider an example of two players preparing to play a computerized chess game
for $100K prize. Suppose the players simultaneously choose among two available options: to use
a $10K program A or an advanced program B, which costs $50K. We refer to the row chooser as
white and to the column chooser as black, with the corresponding advantages reﬂected by the winprobabilities of white described in Table 1a. For example, when both players use program A, white
wins 55% of the time and black wins 45% of the time (we ignore draws). The players naturally want
to choose strategies to maximize their expected net payoffs, i.e., their expected payoff minus their
cost. Each cell in Table 1b contains a pair of payoffs in units of thousands of dollars; the ﬁrst is




b) A (-10) B (-50)
A (-10) 45, 35 3, 37
B (-50) 43,-3 1,-1
Figure 1: a) Table of ﬁrst-player winning probabilities based on program choices. b) Table of
expected net earnings in thousands of dollars. The unique equilibrium is (A,B) which strongly
favors the second player.
A surprising property is evident in the above game. Everything about the game seems to favor white.
Yet due to the (symmetric) costs, at the unique Nash equilibrium (A,B) of Table 1b, black wins 87%
of the time and nets $34K more than white. In fact, it is a dominant strategy for white to play A and
for black to play B. To see this, note that playing B increases white’s probability of winning by 38%,
independent of what black chooses. Since the pot is $100K, this is worth $38K in expectation, but B
costs $40K more than A. On the other hand, black enjoys a 42% increase in probability of winning
due to B, independent of what white does, and hence is willing to pay the extra $40K.
Beforeformulatingthegeneralmodel, wecommentonsomeimportantaspectsofthechessexample.
First, traditional game theory states that chess can be solved in “only” two rounds of elimination of
dominated strategies [10], and the outcome with optimal play should always be the same: either a
win for white or a win for black. This theoretical prediction fails in practice: in top play, the outcome
is very nondeterministic with white winning roughly twice as often as black. The game is too large
and complex to be solved by brute force.
Second, wehavebeenabletoanalyzetheabovechessprogramselectionexampleexactlybecausewe
formulated as a game with a small number of available strategies per player. Another formulation
that would ﬁt into our model would be to include all strategies of chess, with some reasonable
computational costs. However, it is beyond our means to analyze such a large game.
Third, in the example above we used monetary software cost to illustrate a type of strategy cost. But
the same analysis could accommodate many other types of costs that can be measured numerically
and subtracted from the payoffs, such as time or effort involved in the development or execution of a
strategy, and other resource costs. Additional examples in this paper include the number of states in
a ﬁnite automaton, the number of gates in a circuit, and the number of turns on a commuter’s route.
Our analysis is limited, however, to cost functions that depend only on the strategy of the player and
not the strategy chosen by its opponent. For example, if our players above were renting computers
A or B and paying for the time of actual usage, then the cost of using A would depend on the choice
of computer made by the opponent.
Generalizing the example above, we consider a normal form game with the addition of strategy
costs, a player-dependent cost for playing each available strategy. Our main results regard two
important classes of games: constant-sum and potential games. Potential games with strategy costs
remain potential games. While two-person constant-sum games are no longer constant, we give a
basic structural description of optimal play in these games. Lastly, we show that known learning
dynamics converge in both classes of games.
2 Deﬁnition of strategy costs
We ﬁrst deﬁne an N-person normal-form game G = (N;S;p) consisting of ﬁnite sets of (available)
pure strategies S = (S1;:::;SN) for the N players, and a payoff function p : S1 £ ::: £ SN !
R
N: Players simultaneously choose strategies si 2 Si after which player i is rewarded with
pi(s1;:::;sN). A randomized or mixed strategy ¾i for player i is a probability distribution over
its pure strategies Si,
¾i 2 ¢i =
n
x 2 RjSij :
X
xj = 1;xj ¸ 0
o
:We extend p to ¢1 £ ::: £ ¢N in the natural way, i.e., pi(¾1;:::;¾N) = E[pi(s1;:::;sN)]
where each si is drawn from ¾i, independently. Denote by s¡i = (s1;s2;:::;si¡1;si+1;:::;sN)
and similarly for ¾¡i. A best response by player i to ¾¡i is ¾i 2 ¢i such that pi(¾i;¾¡i) =
max¾0
i2¢i pi(¾0
i;¾¡i). A (mixed strategy) Nash equilibrium of G is a vector of strategies
(¾1;:::;¾N) 2 ¢1 £ ::: £ ¢N such that each ¾i is a best response to ¾¡i.
We now deﬁne G¡c, the game G with strategy costs c = (c1;:::;cN), where ci : Si ! R. It is
simply an N-person normal-form game G¡c = (N;S;p¡c) with the same sets of pure strategies as
G, but with a new payoff function p¡c : S1 £ ::: £ SN ! RN where,
p
¡c
i (s1;:::;sN) = pi(s1;:::;sN) ¡ ci(si);for i = 1;:::;N:
We similarly extend ci to ¢i in the natural way.
3 Two-person constant-sum games with strategy costs
Recall that a game is constant-sum (k-sum for short) if at every combination of individual strate-
gies, the players’ payoffs sum to some constant k. Two-person k-sum games have some important
properties, not shared by general sum games, which result in more effective game-theoretic analysis.
In particular, every k-sum game has a unique value v 2 R. A mixed strategy for player 1 is called
optimal if it guarantees payoff ¸ v against any strategy of player 2. A mixed strategy for player 2 is
optimal if it guarantees ¸ k ¡ v against any strategy of player 1. The term optimal is used because
optimal strategies guarantee as much as possible (v + k ¡ v = k) and playing anything that is not
optimal can result in a lesser payoff, if the opponent responds appropriately. (This fact is easily il-
lustrated in the game rock-paper-scissors – randomizing uniformly among the strategies guarantees
each player 50% of the pot, while playing anything other than uniformly random enables the oppo-
nent to win strictly more often.) The existence of optimal strategies for both players follows from the
min-max theorem. An easy corollary is that the Nash equilibria of a k-sum game are exchangeable:
they are simply the cross-product of the sets of optimal mixed strategies for both players. Lastly, it
is well-known that equilibria in two-person k-sum games can be learned in repeated play by simple
dynamics that are guaranteed to converge [17].
With the addition of strategy costs, a k-sum game is no longer k-sum and hence it is not clear, at ﬁrst,
what optimal strategies there are, if any. (Many examples of general-sum games do not have optimal
strategies.) We show the following generalization of the above properties for zero-sum games with
strategies costs.
Theorem 1. Let G be a ﬁnite two-person k-sum game and G¡c be the game with strategy costs
c = (c1;c2).
1. There is a value v 2 R for G¡c and nonempty sets OPT1 and OPT2 of optimal mixed
strategies for the two players. OPT1 is the set of strategies that guarantee player 1 payoff
¸ v ¡ c2(¾2), against any strategy ¾2 is chosen by player 2. Similarly, OPT2 is the set of
strategies that guarantee player 2 payoff ¸ k ¡ v ¡ c1(¾1) against any ¾1.
2. The Nash equilibria of G¡c are exchangeable: the set of Nash equilibria is OPT1£OPT2.
3. The set of net payoffs possible at equilibrium is an axis-parallel rectangle in R2.
For zero-sum games, the term optimal strategy was natural: the players could guarantee v and k¡v,
respectively, and this is all that there was to share. Moreover, it is easy to see that only pairs of
optimal strategies can have the Nash equilibria property, being best responses to each other.
In the case of zero-sum games with strategy costs, the optimal structure is somewhat counter-
intuitive. First, it is strange that the amount guaranteed by either player depends on the cost of
the other player’s action, when in reality each player pays the cost of its own action. Second, it is
not even clear why we call these optimal strategies. To get a feel for this latter issue, notice that
the sum of the net payoffs to the two players is always k ¡ c1(¾1) ¡ c2(¾2), which is exactly the
total of what optimal strategies guarantee, v ¡c2(¾2)+k ¡v ¡c1(¾1). Hence, if both players play
what we call optimal strategies, then neither player can improve and they are at Nash equilibrium.
On the other hand, suppose player 1 selects a strategy ¾1 that does not guarantee him payoff at leastv ¡ c2(¾2). This means that there is some response ¾2 by player 2 for which player 1’s payoff is
< v ¡ c2(¾2) and hence player 2’s payoff is > k ¡ v ¡ c1(¾1). Thus player 2’s best response to ¾1
must give player 2 payoff > k ¡ v ¡ c1(¾1) and leave player 1 with < v ¡ c2(¾2).
The proof of the theorem (though the above is an argument for why part 2 follows from part 1)
is based on the following simple observation. Consider the k-sum game H = (N;S;q) with the
following payoffs:
q1(s1;s2) = p1(s1;s2) ¡ c1(s1) + c2(s2) = p
¡c
1 (s1;s2) + c2(s2)
q2(s1;s2) = p2(s1;s2) ¡ c2(s1) + c1(s1) = p
¡c
2 (s1;s2) + c1(s1)
That is to say, Player 1 pays its strategy cost to Player 2 and vice versa. It is easy to verify that,
8¾1;¾0
1 2 ¢1;¾2 2 ¢2 q1(¾1;¾2) ¡ q1(¾0
1;¾2) = p
¡c




This means that the relative advantage in switching strategies in games G¡c and H are the same.
In particular, ¾1 is a best response to ¾2 in G¡c if and only if it is in H. A similar equality holds
for player 2’s payoffs. Note that these conditions imply that the games G¡c and H are strategically
equivalent in the sense deﬁned by Moulin and Vial [16].
Proof of Theorem 1. Let v be the value of the game H. For any strategy ¾1 that guarantees player
1 payoff ¸ v in H, ¾1 guarantees player 1 ¸ v ¡ c2(¾2) in G¡c. This follows from the deﬁnition
of H. Similarly, any strategy ¾2 that guarantees player 2 payoff ¸ k ¡ v in H will guarantee
¸ k¡v¡c1(¾1) in G¡c. Thus the sets OPT1 and OPT2 are non-empty. Since v¡c2(¾2)+k¡v¡
c1(¾1) = k ¡ c1(¾1) ¡ c2(¾2) is the sum of the payoffs in G¡c, nothing greater can be guaranteed
by either player.
Since the best responses of G¡c and H are the same, the Nash equilibria of the two games are the
same. Since H is a k-sum game, its Nash equilibria are exchangeable, and thus we have part 2. (This
holds for any game that is strategically equivalent to k-sum.)
Finally, the optimal mixed strategies OPT1, OPT2 of any k-sum game are convex sets. If we look at
the achievable costs of the mixed strategies in OPTi, by the deﬁnition of the cost of a mixed strategy,
this will be a convex subset of R, i.e., an interval. By parts 1 and 2, the set of achievable net payoffs
at equilibria of G¡c are therefore the cross-product of intervals.
To illustrate Theorem 1 graphically, Figure 2 gives a 4 £ 4 example with costs of 1, 2, 3, and
4, respectively. It illustrates a situation with multiple optimal strategies. Notice that player 1 is
completely indifferent between its optimal choices A and B, and player 2 is completely indifferent
between C and D. Thus the only question is how kind they would like to be to their opponent. The
(A,C) equilibrium is perhaps most natural as it is yields the highest payoffs for both parties.
Note that the proof of the above theorem actually shows that zero-sum games with costs share
additional appealing properties of zero-sum games. For example, computing optimal strategies is
a polynomial time-computation in an n £ n game, as it amounts to computing the equilibria of H.
We next show that they also have appealing learning properties. (They do not share all properties of
zero-sum games. 1)
3.1 Learning in repeated two-person k-sum games with strategy costs
Another desirable property of k-sum games is that, in repeated play, natural learning dynamics
converge to the set of Nash equilibria. Before we state the analogous conditions for k-sum games
with costs, we brieﬂy give a few deﬁnitions. A repeated game is one in which players chooses a
sequence of strategies vectors s1;s2;:::, where each st = (st
1;:::;st
N) is a strategy vector of some
ﬁxed stage game G = (N;S;p). Under perfect monitoring, when selecting an action in any period
1One property that is violated by the chess example is the “advantage of an advantage” property. Say Player
1 has the advantage over Player 2 in a square game if p1(s1;s2) ¸ p2(s2;s1) for all strategies s1;s2. At
equilibrium of a k-sum game, a player with the advantage must have a payoff at least as large as its opponent.
This is no longer the case after incorporating strategy costs, as seen in the chess example, where Player 1 has
the advantage (even including strategy costs), yet his equilibrium payoff is smaller than 2’s.a) A B C D
A 6, 4 5, 5 3, 7 2, 8
B 7, 3 6, 4 4, 6 3, 7
C 7.5, 2.5 6.5, 3.5 4.5, 5.5 3.5, 6.5
D 8.5, 1.5 7, 3 5.5, 4.5 4.5, 5.5
b) A (-1) B (-2) C (-3) D (-4)
A (-1) 5, 3 4, 3 2, 4 1, 4
B (-2) 5, 2 4, 2 2, 3 1, 3
C (-3) 4.5, 1.5 3.5, 1.5 1.5, 2.5 0.5, 2.5































































Figure 2: a) Payoffs in 10-sum game G. b) Expected net earnings in G¡c. OPT1 is any mixture of
A and B, and OPT2 is any mixture of C and D. Each player’s choice of equilibrium strategy affects
only the opponent’s net payoff. c) A graphical display of the payoff pairs. The shaded region shows
the rectangular set of payoffs achievable at mixed strategy Nash equilibria.
the players know all the previous selected actions.As we shall discuss, it is possible to learn to play
without perfect monitoring as well.
Perhaps the most intuitive dynamics are best-response: at each stage, each player selects a best
responsetotheopponent’spreviousstageplay. Unfortunately, thesenaivedynamicsfailstoconverge
to equilibrium in very simple examples. The ﬁctitious play dynamics prescribe, at stage t, selecting
any strategy that is a best response to the empirical distribution of opponent’s play during the ﬁrst
t ¡ 1 stages. It has been shown that ﬁctitious play converges to equilibrium (of the stage game G)
in k-sum games [17].
However, ﬁctitious play requires perfect monitoring. One can learn to play a two-person k-sum
game with no knowledge of the payoff table or anything about the other players actions. Using
experimentation, the only observations required by each player are its own payoffs in each period
(in addition to the number of available actions). So-called bandit algorithms [7] must manage the
exploration-exploitation tradeoff. The proof of their convergence follows from the fact that they are
no-regret algorithms. (No-regret algorithms date back to Hannan in the 1950’s [12], but his required
perfect monitoring). The regret of a player i at stage T is deﬁned to be,














that is, how much better in hindsight player i could have done on the ﬁrst T stages had it used
one ﬁxed strategy the whole time (and had the opponents not changed their strategies). Note that
regret can be positive or negative. A no-regret algorithm is one in which each player’s asymptotic
regret converges to (¡1;0], i.e., is guaranteed to approach 0 or less. It is well-known that no-
regret condition in two-person k-sum games implies convergence to equilibrium (see, e.g., [13]).In particular, the pair of mixed strategies which are the empirical distributions of play over time
approaches the set of Nash equilibrium of the stage game.
Inverse-polynomial rates of convergence (that are polynomial also in the size of the game) can be
given for such algorithms. Hence no-regret algorithms provide arguably reasonable ways to play
a k-sum game of moderate size. Note that in general-sum games, no such dynamics are known.
Fortunately, the same algorithm that works for learning in k-sum games seem to work for learning
in such games with strategy costs.
Theorem 2. Fictitious play converges to the set of Nash equilibria of the stage game in a two-person
k-sum game with strategy costs, as do no-regret learning dynamics.
Proof. The proof again follows from equation (1) regarding the game H. Fictitious play dynamics
are deﬁned only in terms of best response play. Since G¡c and H share the same best responses,
ﬁctitious play dynamics are identical for the two games. Since they share the same equilibria and
ﬁctitious play converges to equilibria in H, it must converge in G¡c as well.
For no-regret algorithms, equation (1) again implies that for any play sequence, the regret of each
player i with respect to game G¡c is the same as its regret with respect to the game H. Hence, no
regret in G¡c implies no regret in H. Since no-regret algorithms converge to the set of equilibria in
k-sum games, they converge to the set of equilibria in H and therefore in G¡c as well.
4 Potential games with strategic costs
Let us begin with an example of a potential game, called a routing game [18]. There is a ﬁxed
directed graph with n nodes and m edges. Commuters i = 1;2;:::;N each decide on a route ¼i, to
take from their home si to their work ti, where si and ti are nodes in the graph. For each edge, uv,
let nuv be the number of commuters whose path ¼i contains edge uv. Let fuv : Z ! R be a non-
negative monotonically increasing congestion function. Player i’s payoff is ¡
P
uv2¼i fuv(nuv),
i.e., the negative sum of the congestions on the edges in its path.
An N-person normal form game G is said to be a potential game [15] if there is some potential
function © : S1 £:::SN ! R such that changing a single player’s action changes its payoff by the
change in the potential function. That is, there exists a single function ©, such that for all players i
and all pure strategy vectors s;s0 2 S1 £ ::: £ SN that differ only in the ith coordinate,
pi(s) ¡ pi(s0) = ©(s) ¡ ©(s0): (2)
Potential games have appealing learning properties: simple better-reply dynamics converge to pure-
strategy Nash equilibria, as do the more sophisticated ﬁctitious-play dynamics described earlier
[15]. In our example, this means that if players change their individual paths so as to selﬁshly
reduce the sum of congestions on their path, this will eventually lead to an equilibrium where no
one can improve. (This is easy to see because © keeps increasing.) The absence of similar learning
properties for general games presents a frustrating hole in learning and game theory.
It is clear that the theoretically clean commuting example above misses some realistic considera-
tions. One issue regarding complexity is that most commuters would not be willing to take a very
complicated route just to save a short amount of time. To model this, we consider potential games
with strategy costs. In our example, this would be a cost associated with every path. For example,
suppose the graph represented streets in a given city. We consider a natural strategy complexity cost
associated with a route ¼, say ¸(#turns(¼))2, where there is a parameter ¸ 2 R and #turns(¼) is
deﬁned as the number of times that a commuter has to turn on a route. (To be more precise, say each
edge in the graph is annotated with a street name, and a turn is deﬁned to be a pair of consecutive
edges in the graph with different street names.) Hence, a best response for player i would minimize:
min
¼ from si to ti
(total congestion of ¼) + ¸(#turns(¼))2:
While adding strategy costs to potential games allows for much more ﬂexibility in model design, one
might worry that appealing properties of potential games, such as having pure strategy equilibria and
easy learning dynamics, no longer hold. This is not the case. We show that strategic costs ﬁt easily
into the potential game framework:Theorem 3. For any potential game G and any cost functions c, G¡c is also a potential game.
Proof. Let © be a potential function for G. It is straightforward to verify that the G¡c admits the
following potential function ©0:
©0(s1;:::;sN) = ©(s1;:::;sN) ¡ c1(s1) ¡ ::: ¡ cN(sN):
5 Additional remarks
Part of the reason that the notion of bounded rationality is so difﬁcult to formalize is that understand-
ing enormous games like chess is a daunting proposition. That is why we have narrowed it down to
choosing among a small number of available programs.
A game theorist might begin by examining the complete payoff table of Figure 1a, which is pro-
hibitively large. Instead of considering only the choices of programs A and B, each player considers
all possible chess strategies. In that sense, our payoff table in 1a would be viewed as a reduction of
the “real” normal form game. A computer scientist, on the other hand, may consider it reasonable
to begin with the existing strategies that one has access to. Regardless of how you view the process,
it is clear that for practical purposes players in real life do simplify and analyze “smaller” sets of
strategies. Even if the players consider the option of engineering new chess-playing software, this
can be viewed as a third strategy in the game, with its own cost and expected payoffs.
Again, when considering small number of available strategies, like the two programs above, it may
still be difﬁcult to assess the expected payoffs that result when (possibly randomized) strategies play
against each other. An additional assumption made throughout the paper is that the players share the
same assessments about these expected payoffs. Like other common-knowledge assumptions made
in game theory, it would be desirable to weaken this assumption. In the special families of games
studied in this paper, and perhaps in additional cases, learning algorithms may be employed to reach
equilibrium without knowledge of payoffs.
5.1 Finite automata playing repeated games
There has been a large body of interesting work on repeated games played by ﬁnite automata (see
[14] for a survey). Much of this work is on achieving cooperation in the classic prisoner’s dilemma
game (e.g., [2, 3, 4, 5]). Many of these models can be incorporated into the general model outlined
in this paper.
For example, to view the Abreu and Rubinstein model [6] as such, consider the normal form of an
inﬁnitely repeated game with discounting, but restricted to strategies that can be described by ﬁnite
automata (the payoffs in every cell of the payoff table are the discounted sums of the inﬁnite streams
of payoffs obtained in the repeated game). Let the cost of a strategy be an increasing function of the
number of states it employs.
For Neyman’s model [3], consider the normal form of a ﬁnitely repeated game with a known number
of repetitions. You may consider strategies in this normal form to be only ones with a bounded
number of states, as required by Neyman, and assign zero cost to all strategies. Alternatively, you
may allow all strategies but assign zero cost to ones that employ number of states below Neyman’s
bounds, and an inﬁnite cost to strategies that employ a number of states that exceeds Neyman’s
bounds.
The structure of equilibria proven in Theorem 1 applies to all the above models when dealing with
repeated k-sum games, as in [2].
6 Future work
There are very interesting questions to answer about bounded rationality in truly large games that
we did not touch upon. For example, consider the factoring game from the introduction. A pure
strategy for Player 1 would be outputting a single n-bit number. A pure strategy for Player 2 would
be any factoring program, described by a circuit that takes as input an n-bit number and attempts
to output a representation of its prime factorization. The complexity of such a strategy would be anincreasing function of the number of gates in the circuit. It would be interesting to make connections
between asymptotic algorithm complexity and games.
Another direction regards an elegant line of work on learning to play correlated equilibria by re-
peated play [11]. It would be natural to consider how strategy costs affect correlated equilibria.
Finally, it would also be interesting to see how strategy costs affect the so-called “price of anarchy”
[19] in congestion games.
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